Nouriel Roubini writes: Even
if the Treasury TARP plan is implemented fairly and efficiently the US
will not avoid a severe U-shaped18-month recession and a severe
financial and banking crisis: the recession train has already left the
station in Q1 and the financial/banking crisis will be severe
regardless of what the Treasury and the Fed do from now on. What a
proper rescue plan can do is to avoid having the US experience a
multi-year L-shaped recession and extreme financial crisis like the one
that led to a decade long stagnation in Japan in the 1990s after the
bursting of their real estate and equity bubbles.
I
have also argued that, in order to resolve this financial crisis it is
not enough to take the bad/toxic assets off the balance sheet of the
financial institutions (a new RTC); it is also necessary and
fundamental to reduce the debt overhang of millions of insolvent
households via a significant debt reduction on their mortgages (an HOLC
program like the one that was implement during the Great Depression);
and also recapitalize undercapitalized banks with public capital in the
form of preferred shares (as the RFC did with 4000 banks during the
Great Depression). An RTC scheme without an HOLC and RFC component
would not resolve two fundamental problems: millions of households are
insolvent and unable to service their mortgages; the financial system
is vastly undercapitalized and needs capital to avoid an ugly credit
crunch and to foster new credit creation that is needed for future
growth.
That is why I proposed the creation of a HOME (Home Owners’ Mortgage Enterprise)
that would be a combination of an RTC, a HOLC and a RFC. Let me flesh
out this proposal and its key elements and compare it to the Treasury
TARP proposal that in its current form has many flaws.
There are 10 steps in this HOME proposal to resolve this most severe financial crisis. Here they are:
First,
like in the Treasury TARP plan you need to buy illiquid/toxic assets
and take them off the balance sheet of banks and financial institutions
to reliquify them and allow new credit creation. The biggest problem
here – as the debate between Bernanke and senators yesterday is one of
the proper valuation and the proper price at which the government
should buy these assets (the RTC did not have this problem as it was
working out assets of failed S&Ls): if the government buys the
asset at at price that is too high (too small of discount relative to
face value) the fiscal cost will be huge and you massively subsidize
reckless bankers and their shareholders. If you buy at a discount that
is too high you minimize the fiscal cost in the short run but many
banks could go bust and the eventual fiscal cost of bailing out the
depositors of failed banks could be large. You can debate endlessly
whether such assets should be bought at current market price or at
prices closer to hold to maturity values (as Bernanke suggested). Given
that these assets are impaired pricing the long run value of them is
mission impossible. Thus, there is only one solution to this
fundamental uncertainty: avoid the government overpaying by having the
government having some of the positive benefits of an upside gain in
case the banks’ values recover after the bailout. I.e. you need for the
government to have some equity in the banks whose assets are purchased
by the government. This leads to step 2 of the proposal.
Second,
in exchange for the purchase of illiquid asset (at whatever price it is
agreed) the government gets preferred shares in the financial
institutions that senior to existing common and preferred shares and
that are convertible into common shares to allow government to
participate into any future upside.
Third, even if the
government gets preferred shares as in step 2, the banks will need more
capital if they are undercapitalized and they have not fully
reserved/provisioned for the losses coming from writing down the asset
being sold to the government. So you will need to inject further actual
public capital in the form of preferred shares in the financial
institutions ( this is what the RFC did during the Great Depression).
Fourth,
given the risk to the government deriving from the public injection of
capital in the financial system the existing shareholders of the banks
need to take a first-tier loss to minimize the risks for the government
share. How to do that? First, you need to suspend dividend payments on
common share and possibly even existing preferred shared; you also need
to force to partially match the public capital injection with new Tier
1 capital.
Fifth, public and private recapitalization of
financial institutions unfairly benefits unsecured creditors (all
creditors but insured depositors) of such institutions. So, you also
need to convert some of this unsecured debt (the sub debt and other
debt unsecured debt) into equity (a debt for equity swap). Such swap
further reduce the leverage of the financial system (leading to a lower
debt to equity ratio for financial institutions).
Sixth, after
this crisis is resolved the banking and financial system may need lower
capital than before this crisis so as to avoid new asset and credit
bubbles; and if you recapitalize some banks that will be able to lend
more (still with lower leverage ratios) you still need to let other
insolvent banks and financial institutions to go bust and disappear.
Only healthier institution should survive. So you need to a systematic
triage between banks that are distressed, undercapitalized and illiquid
but solvent once the private and public recapitalization occurs from
those that are fundamentally insolvent and that need to be shut down.
You need to destroy the bad apples to let the good ones or the sick but
curable ones survive and thrive.
Seventh, as in the case of the
RTC the assets of the banks that are bankrupt and are allowed to fail
go to the HOME for workout (debt restructuring/reduction).
Eighth,
you need an HOLC-like program for debt reduction of the household
sector. Households in the US have too much debt (subprime, near prime,
prime mortgages, home equity loans, credit cards, auto loans and
student loans) while their assets (values of their homes and stocks)
are plunging leading to a sharp fall in their net worth. And households
are getting buried under this mountain of mounting debt and rising debt
servicing burdens. Thus, a fraction of the household sector – as well
as a fraction of the financial sector and a fraction of the corporate
sector and of the local government sector – is insolvent and needs debt
relief. When a country (say Russia, Ecuador or Argentina) has too much
debt and is insolvent it defaults and gets debt reduction and is then
able to resume fast growth; when a firm is distressed with excessive
debt it goes into bankruptcy court and gets debt relief that allows it
to resume investment, production and growth; when a household is
financially distressed it also needs debt relief to be able to have
more discretionary income to spend. So any unsustainable debt problem
requires debt reduction. The lack of debt relief to the distressed
households is the reason why this financial crisis is becoming more
severe and the economic recession - with a sharp fall now in real
consumption spending – now worsening. The fiscal actions taken so far
(income relief to households via tax rebates) and bailouts of
distressed financial institutions (Bear Stearns creditors’ bailout,
Fannie and Freddie and AIG) do not resolve the fundamental debt problem
for two reasons. First, you cannot grow yourself out of a debt problem:
when debt to disposable income is too high increasing the denominator
with tax rebates is ineffective and only temporary; i.e. you need to
reduce the nominator (the debt). Second, rescuing distressed
institutions without reducing the debt problem of the borrowers does
not resolve the fundamental insolvency of the debtor that limits its
ability to consume and spend and thus drags the economy into a more
severe economic contraction. So of the five possible uses of fiscal
policy – income relief to households (the 2008 tax rebate),
rescue/bailout of financial institutions (Bears Stearns, Fannie and
Freddie, AIG), purchase of assets of failed institutions (an RTC-like
institution), recapitalization of undercapitalized financial
institutions (an RFC-like institution), government purchase of
distressed mortgages to provide debt relief to households (an HOLC-like
institution) – the last option is the most important and effective to
resolve this severe financial and economic crisis. During the Great
Depression the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was create to buy
mortgages from bank at a discount price, reduce further the face value
of such mortgages and refinance distressed homeowners into new
mortgages with lower face value and lower fixed rate mortgage rates.
This massive program allowed millions of households to avoid losing
their homes and ending up in foreclosure. The HOLC bought mortgages for
two year and managed such assets for 18 years at a relatively low
fiscal cost (as the assets were bought at a discount and reducing the
face value of the mortgages allowed home owners to avoid defaulting on
the refinanced mortgages). A new HOLC will be the macro equivalent of
creating a large “bad bank” where the bad assets of financial
institutions are taken off their balance sheets and
restructured/reduced.
Ninth, we need to avoid a situation where
the recapitalization of the banks and the resolution of this financial
crisis leads to another credit and asset bubble. Many things need to be
done to avoid this risk but a rapid change of the Basel II capital
adequacy ratios to reduce their the pro-cyclicality would be essential.
Tenth, start
implementing rapidly a reform of the system of regulation and
supervision of financial institutions in a world of financial
globalization. With the collapse of most of the shadow banking
system most of these shadow banks are now being folded in the
traditional banks and will be regulated like banks. Indeed all
institutions of large size and that are systemically important
(commercial banks, investment banks, non-bank mortgage lenders, hedge
funds, private equity funds, etc.) should be supervised and regulated
in a similar way. To make the financial system more stable over time
and avoid severe financial crises like the current one will require
that both banks and former shadow banks be regulated and supervised
better than they have been in the last decade. After all traditional
banks have performed as poorly – and some more poorly – and have lost
more money than shadow banks during this severe financial crisis. So
both the poor regulation and supervision of banks (as regulators were
asleep at the wheel while the laissez fair ideology and voodoo-cult of
self-regulation and market discipline and internal risk management
became dominant) and the lack of sensible regulation of shadow banks
lies behind the current financial disaster. Thus, folding shadow banks
back into the traditional banking system will make the overall
financial system more stable only if the proper reform of the
regulation and supervision of financial institutions in a world of
financial globalization will be undertaken. (09/24/08)
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